CONTRASTING PATHS: POLITICAL CAREERS OF LABOR AND LIBERAL STATE PARTY OFFICIALS

STEPHEN MILLS, *UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY*

When Robert Menzies convened the Canberra Conference in October 1944 to unite the diverse fragments of non-Labor politics into a national party, he made clear his respect for the governing Labor Party's organisational model. Addressing an audience familiar with war, Menzies employed military metaphors to describe Labor as a "concerted force with one command and with one staff"; he suggested non-Labor could not prevail in the "political warfare" with their "divided units under separate command, and with no general staff". Listing the "defects" in non-Labor's organisational structure, Menzies' first item was the lack of a Federal organisation, "which means we have no Federal secretariat, and therefore no true nexus between the Federal Parliamentary Party and those who are to do the political work in the field" (Starr, 1980, p. 75). Seeking a Federal Director to head up this inaugural federal secretariat, the Liberals found a real brigadier for its general staff. Don Cleland was a Perth lawyer and perennially unsuccessful conservative candidate for parliament; he was also an experienced wartime military administrator, where he had risen to the rank of brigadier as a quartermaster in North Africa and New Guinea. Appointed in October 1945, Cleland lost his first campaign in 1946 - and Menzies returned to the theme of Labor's superior campaigning methods: "We need to face up to the fact that the Labor Party has a clever set of advertising tradesmen at work in the centre." The Liberals then hired Labor's advertising agent, Sim Rubensohn, whose long-running campaign of anti-Labor radio and print advertising helped the Liberals to victory in 1949. With a win under his belt, Cleland was appointed by the Menzies government to administer Papua New Guinea; he was knighted in 1961 (Goot, 2002; Hancock, 2000; Mills, 1986; Nelson, 1993).

Cleland's Labor counterpart in 1949 was Pat Kennelly, a career party bureaucrat first hired by the Victorian Labor Party as a 16-year old clerk in 1926 and elected federal secretary in 1946. Kennelly, renowned in Labor folklore for his stuttering insistence that 'he didn't care who won the argument, just so long as he got to count the votes', had also been elected to the Legislative Council in 1938 and, from 1947, was also Victorian state secretary. This multiple office-holding – his predecessor, Danny McNamara, had held parliamentary and party posts for two decades – provided an effective cost-subsidy for a cash-strapped party organisation, while providing the federal secretary with the authority and networks to play an increasingly influential role in party affairs. Following Labor's defeats at the 1949 and 1951 Federal elections, Kennelly was elected to the Senate in 1953 where he served until 1971 (Love, n.d.; McMullin, 1991, p. 265; Weller & Lloyd, 1978).

Cleland and Kennelly had taken contrasting paths towards their role in Head Office. Cleland was an army man and an experienced administrator, but a political neophyte; Kennelly was a party man and politically numerate - a veteran insider. Menzies was trying to emulate Labor by creating a role at the apex of the party's administrative machinery, responsible for running election campaigns, linking party members and parliamentary representatives, and coordinating the diverse state branches with their rival interests and personalities. But while the Liberals were creating a role at the behest of – and to serve - the Federal parliamentary leadership, Kennelly's role was a creature of the extra-parliamentary structure; Menzies wanted a "nexus" through which parliamentarians could direct the troops in the field while the Labor model, with its traditions of internal democracy,

positioned Head Office as the agent of the members, servicing their needs and imposing their priorities on their parliamentary representatives. While Cleland was a salaried officer, in a new Party aiming to be funded from members and supporters directly, Kennelly's role was at least partly subsidised by taxpayers. Importantly, Cleland was appointed to his post while Kennelly's post was nominally elected by the Federal Executive. Taken together, these roles offer suggestive insights into comparative patterns of party organisation at the very time when Australia's party system was entering its "golden age" of mass membership (Marsh, 2006).

Party employees constitute "one of the most under-researched fields in the study of political parties" (Webb & Kolodny, 2006, p. 337); the observation applies with full force to Australian political studies. Since Cleland and Kennelly, eighteen individuals have headed the Head Offices of Australia's two major political parties as National Secretary of the Australian Labor Party or Federal Director of the Liberal Party of Australia (Table 1). Many more have worked in subordinate roles in the Federal Head Office, and more still in the various state and territory branches of the parties. Occasionally, some of these officials appear in political narrative and analysis. But this is usually in an episodic and party-specific context. There has been no comprehensive comparative study of the *role* of the parties' Head Offices, and little effort to test whether the patterns of party organisation exemplified by Cleland and Kennelly were merely artefacts of their time or whether they illustrate something of significance about the overall evolution of Australia's major political parties. (Ian Hancock's work on the Liberal Party is a notable exception.) One can speculate on the reasons for this neglect. Perhaps scholars disdain the apparently mundane administrative work of Head Office. More likely, they have been frustrated or deterred by an apparently bipartisan reticence on the part of Head Office officials to discuss internal party affairs, to expose their competitive interests or to distract attention from their parliamentary colleagues (Panebianco, 1988, p. 221). Surely, a study of party administrators in Head Office is long overdue.

The author's doctoral research embarks on this task, focussing at the Federal level on the most senior occupants of the Labor and Liberal Head Offices. This paper deals with the state-level counterparts of these Federal officials: the secretaries of state branches of the Labor Party and directors of state divisions of the Liberal Party. (These titles will be used throughout, though in some instances a different designation was used such as General Secretary).

HEAD OFFICE: DOES IT MATTER?

Before turning to the research, it is worth establishing why, to put it bluntly, we should bother about these functionaries. So much has already been written about political parties: can Head Office teach us anything new or important about the parties as a whole? An affirmative answer comes in three related parts. Head Office performs work that is of vital important to the parties and indeed to Australian representative democracy; this work has changed, and potentially increased, the role of Head Office in relation to party members and elected representatives; and third, Head Office officials are political professionals whose contrasting career paths provide insight into the contested process of 'professionalisation' of contemporary politics.

The research significance of Head Office lies first in its responsibility for those tasks, crucial to the democratic model, of election campaigning and legislative recruitment. Campaigning for elected office is the defining characteristic of a political party (Jaensch, 1983, p. 74) and Head Office has a particular responsibility for strategic planning and tactical execution of the campaign; the party's

secretary or director is usually designated as campaign manager. Driven by Head Office, campaigning has undergone dramatic change as parties have adopted new tools in communications, market research and news management; Head Office is also responsible for raising the funds needed to pay for these tools and employing the external consultants who can use them effectively, and has expanded its fundraising focus beyond members to corporates and, increasingly, the taxpayer via the public funding system (Mills, 1986; Young, 2004; Young & Tham, 2006). Head Office also plays a significant role in selection of the party's candidates. Norris notes that "one of the core functions of parties is to determine who can be nominated under their party label from among the pool of eligibles", and active participation by members provides a strong normative underpinning to parties' role in representative democracy (Katz & Mair, 1994; Norris, 1997). Yet Australian practice suggests members are frequently assisted, if not supplanted, by Head Office. For example, Head Office can intervene to replace a member-preferred candidate with a candidate considered to have superior electoral attractiveness or factional support. Further, where elections take place under a list system – for example, for elections to the Senate and state upper houses - Head Office has a central role in selecting candidates and determining the order in which they appear on the ballot paper (and thus the likelihood of their being elected).

Of particularly relevance in this paper, Head Office also serves not just as a selector of candidates but as a source of them; that is, service in Head Office itself provides a basis for selection as a parliamentary candidate. We know that "party service can be a significant factor" in legislative recruitment; indeed as McAllister notes, "there exists a growing pool of party professionals who seek (and sometimes expect) such electoral rewards" (McAllister, 1997). Parliamentarians themselves occasionally acknowledge the frequency with which this happens (for example, Button and Jones cited in Jaensch, 2006; see also Chaney and Ray in Senate CPD, 20 April 1988, p1276). But while many MPs may have party service, we do not know how often such promotion takes place from among the party's paid officials. Nor do we know if this is a recent development or a long-established practice by both parties.

Second, this systemically important work has changed, and arguably strengthened, the role of Head Office relative to the other 'faces' of the party operating 'on the ground' and 'in the legislature' in the familiar tripartite model (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Katz & Mair, 1993; Sorauf, 1968; Ward, 1991). This is a problematic and dynamic relationship (Katz & Mair, 1993). As parties evolved from mass membership to 'catch-all' structures, internal power transferred from members to the central bodies in parliamentary and Head Office (Jaensch, 2006, p. 32). In particular, in pursuit of its campaign responsibilities noted above, Head Office has grown in size, resources, influence, and specialisation in order to centralise and coordinate campaign activity across the entire party, and this has become a year-round, capital-intensive activity. Electoral consideration has become a trump card wielded by Head Office over many previously autonomous party activities such as policy formation and even – with the surreptitious backing of market research - selection of the parliamentary leadership. The diminished flow of member subscriptions to Head Office has been more than replaced through continued solicitation of private (individual and corporate) donations and escalating levels of support from the taxpayer; however where, in the past, revenues might have been devoted to membership services, Head Office increasingly devotes its enlarged revenue streams to meeting campaign costs. In short, Head Offices have been granted – or, perhaps, have seized – a mandate to make the pursuit of electoral success the overriding, even exclusive, mission of the whole party organisation.

Third, Head Office is the central point of a wide-ranging debate about the professionalisation of political parties and of election campaigns. The process of professionalisation has been conceptualised as an adaptive response to the revolutions in mass communications (Farrell & Webb, 2000; Plasser & Plasser, 2002) or as part of a learned adoption of commercial marketing practice (Lees-Marshment, 2009) or as an implementation checklist of campaign tools (Gibson & Rommele, 2009). There is also debate about whether Head Office officials, or the external consultants they hire, are professional in the traditional sense of lawyers or doctors with their formal qualifications, peer-assessment, fee-setting powers, and emotional detachment (Grossman, 2009; Marquand, 2004; Scammell, 1997). It seems clear that the full-time salaried status of Head Office officials, and their possession of specialist skills derived from practical experience, differentiates them from party amateurs and volunteers; in Weber's distinction, they live from politics not for it (Weber, 1994). Yet the 'professionalisation' of Head Office implies something more than the volunteers being supplanted by a new set of salaried 'professional' employees. As Panebianco noted, these "technicians with special knowledge" are essential to an "electoral-professional" party whose gravitational centre is shifting away from its declining member base to the broader electorate (Panebianco, 1988, p. 264). This implies a deep process of cultural transformation and strategic reorientation: the adoption of a managerialist mind-set that plans strategically, allocates resources rationally, calculates risks and minimises errors, while innovating and adapting in a changing environment, all in order to achieve a desired objective - which is defined less in terms of ideology than electoral success. In this sense campaign professionalisation is a subset of the broader continuing process of modernisation, which impacts throughout society with waves of technological and demographic change and organisational innovation providing Head Office professionals with a constantly evolving electoral landscape and campaign toolkit (Papathanassopoulos, Negrine, Mancini, & Holtz-Bacha, 2007, p. 10).

Taken together then, closer research attention to the Head Office appears essential for a more informed understanding of the evolution of political parties in Australia. Yet no consolidated data has been published to enable this research.

A NEW DATA SET OF HEAD OFFICE OFFICIALS

Of the 22 Federal officials identified in Table 1, more than half also worked in the counterpart role in their state Head Office. On the Labor side, Stewart, McNamara, Kennelly, Schmella, Chamberlain and Young were employed as Federal Secretary *while* holding office as a state secretary; subsequently Wyndham, McMullan, Hogg and Bitar attained the Federal post *after* serving as state secretary. On the Liberal side, Crosby and Loughnane went to the Federal role *after* having served as state director, while Pascoe served in the Federal office *before* appointment as state director in Victoria. (Five of the 22 went on to hold elected office in the Federal Parliament: Labor's Kennelly, McMullan, Young and Gray and the Liberals' Robb.)

Experience in the state Head Office, then, seems relevant for promotion to the Federal Head Office. This is true for both parties, though it is not clear on what basis these selections are made, what the rate of promotion is for state officials, or whether similar considerations apply in both parties. To explore these career patterns it was necessary, first, to assemble a consolidated list of those individuals employed in the state party posts and their dates of employment, and then to identify those who subsequently served in other state or federal party Head Offices and/or were elected to state or Federal Parliament.

Prior to this research project, no consolidated list of state officials existed. The state parties' original records are lodged in various archives or, in at least two cases, possibly lost. Several party histories list office holders to the date of publication (for example, Davis, 1983; Freudenberg, 1991; Hancock, 2000, 2006, 2007; Murphy, Joyce, & Hughes, 1980; Oliver, 2003; Parkin & Warhurst, 1983). Party websites are of variable use: while Liberal Party sites in Victoria, New South Wales and Tasmania list all current and former state directors, most Labor state branches identify only current office holders; the Labor website in South Australia and the Liberal one in Western Australian fail to provide even that basic information. The *Australian Dictionary of Biography* and the 'Political Chronicle' series in the *Australian Journal of Politics and History* are invaluable though incomplete sources. Parliamentary websites provide biographical information about members including previous party service. Metropolitan newspapers also yield useful material, searchable via Factiva back to the mid-1990s. Most state offices did respond to emailed information questions from the author; personal communication with some of the individuals yielded additional information.

In compiling the list, only ALP secretaries and Liberal directors of the six states since the 1940s were included, to keep the focus on the senior full-time paid employees of Australia's two major post-war parties. The list does not include officials of the two territories; state Presidents who, while nominally senior, usually serve in an honorary capacity; assistants, deputies, those acting in either role, or those designated only as campaign directors; National Party officials although in Queensland that party has been the larger conservative party. 'Subsequent' employment includes those who held parliamentary and party posts simultaneously.

The search located a total of 164 individuals: 80 Labor state secretaries and 84 Liberal state directors. (This excludes multiple appearances by Liberal officials occupying the same post in different states, discussed further below.) (Tables 2 and 3)

The most striking characteristic is that 95 per cent of state officials – or all bar eight individuals - are male. All Federal secretaries and directors are also male. Only three women have been a Labor state secretary in a mainland state: Melzer, Beacham and Sutherland (who died after less than a year in office); another four served in Tasmanian Labor. Among Liberals, Bev Barber, state director in South Australia since June 2010, is the first and only woman. The persistence of this "machine men" phenomenon suggests that regardless of party label, the Head Offices remain a significant bastion of gendered occupation.

Another striking pattern is that length of tenure has fallen dramatically over the post-war period. In the post-war years, seven state party officials, from both parties, held office for periods exceeding 15 years, led by the Liberal J V McConnell's epic 26 years in Victoria and Labor Joe Chamberlain's unmatched 25 years in WA. All of these long terms were completed by the mid-1970s. Since then, no official in either party has reached double figures, Labor's della Bosca's nine years in NSW being the longest innings. Turnover has increased commensurately; more people are doing this work for shorter periods of time. Taking 1977 as the mid-point of the period under study, and even allowing for the heart-beat regularity of the Tasmanian Liberals throughout the whole period, there are twice as many state secretaries in the second half than in the first (114 compared to 58); terms of two and three years have become common.

Turning to the state officials' subsequent employment, the data shows that 52 of them (32 per cent) went on to be elected to Parliament. (Table 4; several more, not included here, were denied preselection or were defeated as candidates.) Far more Labor officials became MPs than Liberal (43 to 9); in fact, this represents more than half (54 per cent) of all Labor state officials– a remarkable rate of promotion. Although the objects of this study are state-level officials, their Parliamentary options are not limited to their state parliament; indeed around half of those elected (27, including 21 Labor officials) went to Federal Parliament. Again, it might seem that these party functionaries might seek comfortable retirement in the upper chambers, access to which is, as noted above, determined by Head Office's selection of a party list. To the contrary, however; election to a lower house (House of Representatives or a state Assembly) has been nearly as likely over the post-war years as the Senate or a state Council (24 to 28). Election to parliament, then, is a prime career option for state party officials, especially Labor.

This is not a recent development: some 22 of the officials were elected to Parliament in the pre-1977 half of the period, with 30 elected in the more recent half. But there has been change. Those MPs in the post-1977 cohort include a significant number of state and Federal frontbenchers, including a former Premier (Beattie), two state Treasurers (Lenders and Roozendaal), three Federal ministers (Swan, Smith and Evans) and, from Liberal ranks, an Opposition Leader (O'Farrell), former minister (Minchin) and a shadow spokesman (Morrison). These days, state officials are not just winning election to Parliament but are forging significant parliamentary careers.

While Labor state secretaries are pursuing parliamentary election, the data suggests that Liberal state directors have recently followed a different path: internal promotion. State officials of both parties have been promoted vertically to the counterpart role at federal level. But eight state directors have transferred laterally to the same role interstate: Ockerby in the 1950s and, since the 1970s, Burston, Jaeschke, Litchfield, Neeham, Nutt and Sheezel; Kidman transferred to the Northern Territory. Two of these, Jaeschke and Nutt, served as director in three states. No Labor state secretary has transferred laterally.

DISCUSSION

Operating at the centre of their party organisation, state secretaries and directors are well placed to identify emerging electoral opportunities in safe seats or party lists. So is it that Labor officials are just better at pressing their claims to preselection? Do smart Liberals simply prefer to seek opportunities within the party hierarchy? Has the turnover of state officials increased simply because these officials have generally become more restless? No doubt many factors – including personal ambitions, political considerations and resources within each state party - drive individual career choices. Beyond these transient micro factors however, this paper suggests that the careers of individual officials, viewed in totality, provide some broad comparative insights about the way in which Head Office has evolved in relationship to the broader party structures in which they operate.

An important determinant of career opportunities for state officials appears to be the different ways in which the parties select their office holders. Typically, Labor state and federal secretaries are *elected,* by the party executive. These elections can be contested or they can be settled by factional agreement, but the process implies the candidate has a political network or power base within the state party and the appropriate skills to secure election. Labor officials thus seem equipped to translate their party role into parliamentary election; but their power base is limited to the state

within which they operate, perhaps explaining why they can move upwards in the organisation but not laterally. Liberal state and federal directors, by contrast, are *appointed*, by the party executive led by the party president or parliamentary leader, suggesting the candidate needs high level organisational contacts and a strong CV more than a local power base. This practice has allowed the Liberal organisation to import new talent – several state directors come from the army, business, journalism and advertising – while Labor state secretaries are elected from within the party's existing talent pool. Liberals appear to have made a deliberate effort to train a specialist professional campaign staff, exposing them to different political environments, retaining their talent through career planning, transitioning others through ministerial staff ranks, and trading talent across state boundaries according to need. This has been the case since Menzies and Cleland; as Hancock noted of the first generation of Liberal state officials, their lengthy tenure implied institutional stability and a certain "hardheadedness and political savvy" on the part of the individuals concerned (Hancock, 2000, p. 88). More recently, according to one former state director:

> "We were sick of getting bested by Labor's professionalism through the Hawke years, so from [federal director] Andrew Robb onwards we decided at the Federal level to create a core of professionally trained party officials through the states." (Personal interview)

Graham Jaeschke, after announcing his intention to move from the state directorship in South Australia to New South Wales, denied he would use the new post as a 'stepping stone' to Parliament:

> "I have never been interested in becoming a politician and ruled that out long ago. ... NSW is the next logical step in my career within the party's organisational wing." (Bildstien, 2005)

In line with Menzies' original formulation, this Liberal top-down approach breeds a cadre of experienced professionals in Head Office whose responsibility is largely to the parliamentary party; but it also breeds greater job insecurity for the individuals concerned, who are beholden to their local supporters and who lack the powerbase necessary to secure a parliamentary career. The Labor approach is a more complex see-saw. In the early post-war years, Head Office was relatively weak, staffed by parliamentarians such as Kennelly as a part-time add-on. But at the state level and then, from Wyndham also federally, Head Office was populated by full-time officials from outside parliament; and they developed the role to the point where it has become an important source of parliamentary recruitment again blurring the lines between the organisation and the party-in-office (Parkin, 1983, p. 21).

Importantly, where professionalisation in the United States has seen parties largely supplanted in terms of election campaigning by candidates on one hand and consultant on the other, Australian Head Offices remain firmly at the centre of the action. In an idealised sense, the professionalisation of Head Office in Australia can be described as a process that began with traditional party bureaucrats such as Cleland and Kennelly occupying a weak Head Office and *importing* needed campaign skills from external experts such as Rubensohn. Over time, Head Office *developed* in-house capabilities to apply commercial marketing techniques to electorally significant voters, for example marginal seats and swinging voters while also gaining internal party autonomy and influence. And finally, Head Office is fully committed to a professional campaign model and is able

to *export* this mindset to the broad party through influencing, for example, policy formulation and leadership selection.

Another determinant of state officials' career opportunities is of course their performance in the job. But it is clear that length of tenure does not directly correlate with electoral success, one of their principal responsibilities. This can be illustrated by comparing the turnover of state officials with the longevity or turbulence of their parliamentary colleagues in government or opposition; a range of potential combinations emerges:

(1) low Head Office turnover in long-lived governments

(2) low Head Office turnover in turbulent governments

(3) high Head Office turnover in long-lived governments

(4) high Head Office turnover in turbulent governments

(5) low Head Office turnover in long-lived oppositions

(6) low Head Office turnover in turbulent oppositions

(7) high Head Office turnover in long-lived oppositions

(8) high Head Office turnover in turbulent oppositions

A more complex process is suggested in which the shared performance of officials and their parties, in government or in opposition, creates rewards and opportunities relevant to the officials' subsequent career. Thus state officials in (2) and (6) might be rewarded for 'holding the fort' during difficult times (examples: Carlton, McMullan), while for those in (3) the favourable political climate might provide the opportunity for promotion (Beahan, Smith and Evans in WA). Those in (4) might see the opportunity to 'jump ship' or 'walk the plank' (Thistlethwaite), while those in (7) and (8) would appear to have limited career opportunities. For those in (1) and (5), the track record is patchy: for some, lengthy service was followed by parliamentary preferment (Lacey), even those with lengthy spells in opposition (Carrick, Porter); but for others, the effluxion of time appears to have worked against them, despite long periods in government (McConnell). The fear of "missing out" on a desired opportunity would of course be a powerful driver of high turnover of state officials.

So simply being in Government or Opposition does not itself indicate or determine the official's subsequent employment. Yet officials able to secure a *transition* from opposition to government through successful campaign performance seem likely to be rewarded (Hogg, della Bosca, O'Farrell). A striking example is provided by Labor's South Australian branch which, though it had one of the worst electoral records in the western world under the Playford decades, was "the very model of stability and unity" electing office-holders through a power-sharing or "consensus" model (Stokes, 1983). This approach saw four state secretaries in a row, from 1947 to 1968, elected to parliaments as the party slowly recovered, eventually winning power in 1965 for one term. The fifth was M J Young who as state secretary successfully secured Dunstan's re-election in 1970; he went on to become Federal Secretary, was the architect of Whitlam's 1969 and 1972 ("It's Time") election campaigns, and later served as a minister in the Hawke government. Young's assistant in Adelaide, David Combe, succeeded him in the Federal office and is still the longest incumbent of

that role. This is a remarkable sequence. It is surely no coincidence that in 1967, South Australian Labor introduced market research into Australian election campaigning; the practice was transferred by Young to Federal Labor and subsequently became the predominant campaign tool of professionalised Head Offices in both parties (Blewett & Jaensch, 1971).

CONCLUSION

The paper has identified ways in which greater scholarly attention to Head Office will assist our understanding of Australia's political parties, and has published a new data set of Head Office officials at the state level and their subsequent employment. It is apparent that Head Office officials do have opportunities for career development in their parties, which have changed over time and which differ between the two parties. More than half the post-war Labor state secretaries have been elected to Parliament, while a smaller but significant cohort of recent Liberal state directors have been appointed laterally within their national organisation. This evidence of contrasting paths illustrates an important aspect of the broader process of Head Office professionalisation and, in a literature burdened with evidence of party convergence, suggests that party differences continue to matter.

Table 1: ALP National Secretaries and Liberal Party Federal Directors

ALP 1915-2010		Liberal 1945-2010	
Arch Stewart	1915-25	Don Cleland	1945-51
Daniel McNamara	1925-46	Robert Willoughby	1951-69
Patrick Kennelly	1946-54	Bede Hartcher	1969-74
Jack Schmella	1954-60	Tim Pascoe	1974
F E Chamberlain	1961-63	Tony Eggleton	1974-91
Cyril Wyndham	1963-69	Andrew Robb	1991-97
Mick Young	1969-72	Lynton Crosby	1997-2003
David Combe	1973-81	Brian Loughnane	2003-
Bob McMullan	1981-88		
Bob Hogg	1988-94		
Gary Gray	1994-2000		
Geoff Walsh	2000-03		
Tom Gartrell	2003-08		
Karl Bitar	2008-		

Table 2: ALP State Secretaries 1940s-2010 and their Subsequent Employment

	Elected to State Parliament		Elected to Federal Parl't		Party Head Office	
	Lower	Upper	Lower	Upper	State	Fed
New South Wales (total 14 individuals)						
J. Stewart 1941-49		Y				
E G Wright 1950-53		Y				
Charles Anderson 1953-55						
Bill Colbourne 1955-1970						
Peter Westerway 1970-73						
Geoff Cahill 1973-77						
Graham Richardson 1977-83				Y		
Stephen Loosley 1983-90				Y		
John della Bosca 1990-99		Y				
Eric Roozendaal 1999-2004		Y				
Mark Arbib 2004-07				Y		
Karl Bitar 2007-08						Y

	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6
Matt Thistlethwaite 2008-10				Y		
Sam Dastyari 2010-						
Victoria (17)						
Daniel McNamara 1925-47		Y				
Pat Kennelly 1947-49		Y		Y		Y
Dinny Lovegrove 1950-55	Y					
Jack Tripovich 1955-60		Y				
Cyril Wyndham 1961-63						Y
Bill Hartley 1963-70						
Jean Melzer 1970-74				Y		
Bill Tracey 1974-76						
Bob Hogg 1976-83						Y
Peter Batchelor 1983-90	Y					
Jennifer Beacham 1990-94						
John Lenders 1994-99	Y					
David Feeney 1999-2002				Y		
Roland Lindell 2002	Y					
Erik Locke 2003-05						
Stephen Newnham 2005-09						
Nick Reece 2009-						
Queensland (13)						
Syd Bryan 1940-52						
Jack Schmella 1952-60						Y
Jim Keeffe 1960-65				Y		
Tom Burns 1965-71	Y					
Bart Lourigan 1971-76						
Gerry Jones 1977-79				Y		
Peter Beattie 1981-88	Y					
Terry Hampson 1989-91						
Wayne Swan 1991-93			Y			
Mike Kaiser 1993-2000	Y					
Cameron Milner 2000-04						
Milton Dick 2004-07						
Anthony Chisholm 2008-						
Western Australia (10)						
F E Chamberlain 1949-74						Y
Bob McMullan 1975-81						Y
Michael Beahan 1981-87				Y		
Stephen Smith 1987-90			Y			
Chris Evans 1991-93				Y		
Mark Nolan 1993-97						
Mark Cuomo 1997-99						
John Halden 1999-2001						
Bill Johnston 2001-08	Y					
Simon Mead 2008-						
South Australia (13)						
Jim Toohey 1947-53				Y		
Joseph Sexton 1953-58			Y			
Martin Nicholls 1958-63			Y			
Geoff Virgo 1963-68	Y					
Mick Young 1968-73						Y
George Whitten 1974-75	Y					
Howard O'Neil 1975-79						
Chris Schacht 1979-87				Y		
Terry Cameron 1987-94		Y				
John Hill 1994-97	Y					
Kaye Sutherland 1997-98						
Ian Hunter 1998-2006		Y				
Michael Brown 2007-						
Tasmania (13)						
Ernie West 1942-46						
Bert Lacey 1947-65				Y		

	Lower	Upper	Lower	Upper	State	Fed
Doug Lowe 1965-69	Y					
Kath Venn 1969-76		Y				
Patti Warn 1976-80						
Bill Darby 1980-82						
Terry Aulich 1983				Y		
Eugene Alexander 1983-91						
Ian Henderson 1992						
Susan Mackay 1992-96				Y		
David Price 1996-2006						
Julie Collins 2006-07			Y			
John Dowling 2007-						

Table 3: Liberal Party State Directors 1940s-2010 and their Subsequent Employment

	Elected to State Parliament		Elected to Federal Parl't		Party Head Office	
	Lower	Upper	Lower	Upper	State	Fed
New South Wales (15)						
F R Burton 1944-1947						
John Carrick 1948-71				Y		
Jim Carlton 1971-77			Y			
Greg Bartels 1978-81						
Stephen Litchfield 1982-85						
Graeme Starr 1986-88						
Peter Kidman 1989-90					Y	
Robert Maher 1990-92						
Barry O'Farrell 1992-95	Y					
Tony Nutt 1995-97					Y	
John Burston 1997					Y	
Remo Nogaratto 1997-2000						
Scott Morrison 2000-05			Y			
Graham Jaeschke 2005-07						
Mark Neeham 2008-						
Victoria (12)						
J V McConnell 1945-71						
Leo Hawkins 1971-74						
Tim Pascoe 1975-76						
Graham Jennings 1976-77						
Neville Hughes 1977-83						
John Ridley 1984-87						
David Kemp 1987-88			Y			
Petro Georgiou 1989-94			Y			
Peter Poggioli 1994-2000						
Brian Loughnane 2000-03						Y
Julian Sheezel 2003-08					Y	
Tony Nutt 2008-						
Queensland (15)						
Charles Porter 1949-66	Y					
Viv Ockerby 196[ ]-71						
Keith Livingstone 1971-75						
John Leggoe 1975-78						
Stephen Litchfield 1978-82					Y	
Gary Neat 1982-88						
Paul Craig 1988-89						
David Fraser 1989-90						
Graham Currie 1990-91						
Lynton Crosby 1991-93						Y
Jim Barron 1994-97						
Greg Goebel 1997-98						
Graham Jaeschke 1999-2001					Y	
Brendan Cooper 2002-03						
Geoff Greene 2004-08						

Western Australia (12)						
Clive Palmer 1945-54						
Viv Ockerby 1955-68					Y	
Fred Lathby 1968-78						
Charles 'Chilla' Porter 1978-86						
Tom Herzfeld 1986-89						
Tony Hall 1989-90						
Geoff Paddick 1990-93						
Ian Hook 1993-94						
Peter Wells 1995-2003						
Paul Everingham 2003-05						
Mark Neeham 2005-08					Y	
Ben Morton 2008-						
South Australia (14)						
Henry Dunks 1935-52	Y					
Reg Wilson 1952-7[ ]						
J N Vial 1973-76						
B A Taylor 1977						
D Willett 1978-85						
Nick Minchin 1985-1993				Y		
Grahame Morris 1993						
Tony Nutt 1994-95						
David Pigott 1995-98						
Jim Bonner 1998-2001						
Graham Jaeschke 2001-05					Y	
John Burston 2005-09						
Julian Sheezel 2009-10						
Bev Barber 2010-						
Tasmania (26)						
E R Cottier 1945						
Quenten McDougall 1946-47						
J Henty 1947						
A W Potter 1947-50						
V L Ockerby 1951-53					Y	
A Lockhart 1954-56						
P C Firkins 1957-61						
Don Tribolet 1961-70						
Peter Fleming 1970-74						
Geoff Woodhouse 1974						
Bill Raine 1974-77					Y	
Paddy Baker 1977-78						
R D Cheatley 1979-80						
David Morrow 1981-85						
John Chaseling 1985-87						
Clem Hoggett 1987-89						
Barry Dallas 1989-90						
Bob Lister 1990-93						
Tony Steven 1994-97						
David Rowell 1997-98						
David Bushby 1998-2000						
Andrew Gregson 2000-01						
Philip Gaunson 2001						
Peter Skillern 2002-05						
Damien Mantach 2005-08						
Jonathan Hawkes 2008-						

Table 4: State officials subsequently elected to parliament

N = 521	State				Fed				Summary	
	Assembly ALP	Assembly Lib	Council ALP	Council Lib	H of Reps ALP	H of Reps Lib	Senate ALP	Senate Lib	ALP/Lib	Lower/Upper
Pre '77	5	2	6	0	2	1	5	1	18/4	10/12
Post '77	7	1	4	0	3	3	11	1	25/5	14/16

Bildstien, C. (2005, 21 March 2005). Shocked Libs to search for new director. *The Advertiser (Adelaide)*,

Blewett, N., & Jaensch, D. (1971). *Playford to Dunstan*. Melbourne: F W Cheshire.

Dalton, R. J., & Wattenberg, M. P. (Eds.). (2000). *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Davis, R. (1983). *Eighty Years' Labor: the ALP in Tasmania, 1903-1983*. Hobart: Sassafras Books in conjunction with the University of Tasmania.

Farrell, D. M., & Webb, P. (2000). Political Parties as Campaign Organisations. In R. J. Dalton & M. P. Wattenberg (Eds.), *Parties without Partisans - Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Freudenberg, G. (1991). *Cause for Power: the official history of the New South Wales branch of the Australian Labor Party*. Leichhardt, NSW: Pluto Press.

Gibson, R., & Rommele, A. (2009). Measuring the Professionalisation of Political Campaigning. *Party Politics, 15*(3), 265-293.

Goot, M. (Ed.) (2002) Australian Dictionary of Biography (Vols. 16). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Grossman, M. (2009). Going Pro? Political Campaign Consulting and the Professional Model. *Journal of Political Marketing, 8*(2), 81-104.

Hancock, I. (2000). *National and permanent? : the federal organisation of the Liberal Party of Australia 1944-1965* Carlton, Vic: Melbourne University Press.

Hancock, I. (2006). John Carrick: The Influence of Head Office. In K. Turner & M. Hogan (Eds.), *The Worldly Art of Politics*. Annandale, NSW: Federation Press.

Hancock, I. (2007). *The Liberals : a history of the NSW Division of the Liberal Party of Australia 1945-2000*. Annandale, NSW: Federation Press.

Jaensch, D. (1983). *The Australian Party System*. Sydney: George Allen and Unwin.

Jaensch, D. (2006). Party Structures and Procedures. In I. Marsh (Ed.), *Political Parties in Transition*. Sydney: Federation Press.

Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (1993). The Evolution of Party Organisations in Europe: The Three Faces of Party Organisation. *American Review of Politics, 14*(Winter), 593-617 (Reprinted in Wolinetz, S (ed) Political Parties, Ashgate Dartmouth, 1998).

Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (Eds.). (1994). *How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organisations in Western Democracies*. London: Sage Publications.

Lees-Marshment, J. (2009). *Political Marketing - principles and applications*. London: Routledge.

Love, P. (n.d.). Kennelly, Patrick John (Pat) (1900 - 1981). In *Australian Dictionary of Biography* (Vol. 17, pp. 619-620). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Marquand, D. (2004). *Decline of the public : the hollowing-out of citizenship*. Cambridge: Polity.

Marsh, I. (2006). Australia's Political Cartel? The major parties and the party system in an era of globalisation. In I. Marsh (Ed.), *Political Parties in Transition?* Sydney: The Federation Press.

McAllister, I. (1997). Australia. In P. Norris (Ed.), *Passages to power : legislative recruitment in advanced democracies*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

McMullin, R. (1991). *The light on the hill : the Australian Labor Party, 1891-1991*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Mills, S. (1986). *The new machine men : polls and persuasion in Australian politics*. Ringwood, Vic., Australia ; New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Penguin Books.

Murphy, D., Joyce, R. B., & Hughes, C. A. (Eds.). (1980). *Labor in Power: the Labor Party and Governments in Queensland, 1915-57* St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press.

Nelson, H. N. (1993). Cleland, Sir Donald Mackinnon (1901-1975) In *Australian Dictionary of Biography* (Vol. 13, pp. 440-441). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Norris, P. (Ed.). (1997). *Passages to power : legislative recruitment in advanced democracies*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Oliver, B. (2003). *Unity is Strength: A history of the Australian Labor Party and the Trades and Labor Council in Western Australia, 1899-1999*. Perth: API Network, Australian Research Institute, Curtin University.

Panebianco, A. (1988). *Political parties: organization and power* (M. Silver, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Papathanassopoulos, S., Negrine, R., Mancini, P., & Holtz-Bacha, C. (2007). Political Communication in the Era of Professionalisation. In R. Negrine, P. Mancini, C. Holtz-Bacha & S. Papathanassopoulos (Eds.), *The Professionalisation of Political Communication*. Bristol, Chicago: Intellect.

Parkin, A. (1983). Party Organisation and Machine Politics: the ALP in perspective. In A. Parkin & J. Warhurst (Eds.), *Machine Politics in the Australian Labor Party*. North Sydney: George Allen and Unwin.

Parkin, A., & Warhurst, J. (Eds.). (1983). *Machine Politics in the Australian Labor Party*. North Sydney: George Allen & Unwin.

Plasser, F., & Plasser, G. (2002). *Global Political Campaigning: a Worldwide Analysis of Campaign Professionals and their Practices*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.

Scammell, M. (1997). *The Wisdom of the War Room: US Campaigning and Americanization. Research Paper R-17*. Cambridge MA: Joan Shorenstein Center for Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard University

Sorauf, F. (1968). *Party Politics in America*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.

Starr, G. (Ed.). (1980). *The Liberal Party of Australia, A Documentary History*. Richmond, Vic: Drummond/Heinemann.

Stokes, G. (1983). South Australia: consensus politics. In A. Parkin & J. Warhurst (Eds.), *Machine Politics in the Australian Labor Party*. North Sydney: George Allen & Unwin Australia.

Ward, I. (1991). The Changing Organisational Nature of Australia's Political Parties. *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, XXIX*, 153-174.

Webb, P., & Kolodny, R. (2006). Professional Staff in Political Parties. In R. S. Katz & W. Crotty (Eds.), *Handbook of Party Politics* (pp. 337-347). London: Sage Publications.

Weber, M. (1994). Politik als Beruf ('The Profession and Vocation of Politics', 1919). In P. Lassman & R. Speirs (Eds.), *Weber: Political Writings*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Weller, P., & Lloyd, B. (Eds.). (1978). *Federal Executive Minutes 1915-1955: Minutes of the Meetings of the Federal Executive of the Australian Labor Party*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Young, S. (2004). *The Persuaders. Inside the Hidden Machine of Political Advertising*. North Melbourne: Pluto Press Australia.

Young, S., & Tham, J.-C. (2006). *Political finance in Australia: A skewed and secret system*. Canberra: Australian National University. School of Social Sciences. Democratic Audit of Australia.